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The court-like aspects of dispute settlement in the World Trade
Organization (WTO)-the mighty court of world trade backed up by the big
stick of trade sanctions-have been lauded as one of the its major successes.
For better or for worse, these successes have been described as an
"Americanization" of the dispute settlement process that was handed down
from the WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 1 But WTO dispute settlement in this sense may have been too
successful for some of its supporters, even those in the United States. After
an initial period of euphoria, the tide has shifted to cases the results of which
are harder for the United States to digest and which have affected how the
United States uses trade remedy statutes.2 In 1988, ensuring more effective
multilateral dispute settlement and enforcement was the number one U.S.
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I World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) documents are cited throughout this Article. WTO documents can best be
accessed on the WTO website at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode
=simple using either the title or the document number. GATT documents cited herein can
similarly be located on the WTO website. Citations to the GATT Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents (B.I.S.D.) are provided for GATT documents only.
2 In the case of United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
five rounds of litigation led to authorization for the European Communities (EC) to
impose trade sanctions eliminating $4 billion a year in U.S. exports. See WTO, United
States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations'"-Recourse by the European
Communities to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.7 of the DSU,
WT/DS108/26 (Apr. 25, 2003) (approved by Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) May 7,
2003); see also WTO, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/14 (Jun.
30, 2003) [hereinafter Update]. Now that the dispute settlement system has succeeded in
smoothly processing the biggest-stakes case ever in the GATT or the WTO, the EC and
the United States are faced with finding a way to avoid the huge burden presented by
trade sanctions on such a scale.
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negotiating objective for the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. 3 In
2002, Congress's major priority for dispute settlement was fixing recent
WTO decisions on trade remedies.4 The Bush administration, tasked with
coming up with a response, has proposed changing the WTO rules to
facilitate settlement of disputes by negotiation and agreement.
This Article looks at the role of negotiation in WTO dispute settlement,
addressing the question: Why aren't more of these disputes settled between
the parties? The approach taken is both descriptive and theoretical. It starts
with a survey and "thick description ' 5 of consultations and negotiation in
WTO dispute settlement, with examples that illustrate how litigating
governments and stakeholders approach such negotiations and why they have
chosen to litigate or settle in particular cases. The Article then discusses
some of the models used to analyze litigation and settlement in domestic
courts and what they could tell us about WTO dispute settlement.
Insights from the rich literature on economic analysis of litigation and
settlement in domestic courts may be usefully brought to bear on WTO
disputes and may provide guidance regarding the likely effect of possible
changes in the WTO dispute settlement rules. In a domestic setting, typically
ten cases settle out of court for each one that is tried. 6 The settlement rate in
the WTO is much lower: in the first five years of the WTO, 52% of formal
complaints under the WTO dispute settlement procedures resulted in
establishment of a panel to adjudicate the dispute, and 35% of complaints
resulted in a panel ruling. 7 What differences between the two settings matter
in explaining the difference in settlement rates?
3 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1101(b)(1), 19 U.S.C.
§ 2901 (2000).
4 Compare id. (providing U.S. principal trade negotiation objectives for the
Uruguay Round, led by dispute settlement) with Trade Act of 2002 § 2101(b)(3), 19
U.S.C. § 3801 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (not including dispute settlement as such in principal
trade negotiating objectives and including a congressional finding that "[s]upport for
continued trade expansion requires that dispute settlement procedures under international
trade agreements not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in such
agreements").
5 Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture,
in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-30 (1973).
6 Robert Cooter & Daniel Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1067, 1070 (1989) (citing Marc Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know)
About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 44 n.1
(1983)).
7 Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, The Evolution of Dispute Settlement, in TRADE
PoLIcY RESEARCH 144, 151 (John M. Curtis & Dan Ciuriak eds., 2003).
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The empirical analysts of WTO dispute settlement, Marc Busch and Eric
Reinhardt, find that settlement before a panel ruling yields the best outcomes,
that the change to the new, improved WTO dispute settlement rules has made
such settlement less likely, not more, and that failure to reach early
settlements in disputes particularly harms developing countries. 8 If
settlement by negotiation and agreement is a socially desirable goal in itself,
what changes in the rules could help the parties to WTO disputes get to
settlement? The objective is to present both a real-world discussion that
provides useful data for the development of theory and a theoretical
discussion useful for the current debate.
11. NEGOTIATION IN WTO DISPUTES: AN OVERVIEW
Every WTO dispute starts as someone's commercial problem. The
government becomes aware of the problem from a private stakeholder or
otherwise. Unless it is evident that pre-WTO settlement talks will be
fruitless, generally the first step for a government is to approach the
government responsible for the problem, and request that the problem be
removed. Thus, the dispute is launched with a negotiation, which the parties
may continue during formal WTO dispute settlement consultations, during
the panel process, through the end of the panel and appellate process, and
afterwards.
A key characteristic of this negotiation is that it is most often a two-level
negotiation. 9 While one negotiation takes place between the government
8 Id. at 145.
9 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,
42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988), reprinted in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLmcs 431-68 (Peter Evans et al. eds., 1994). Putnam's
article analyzes the outcome of the 1978 Bonn Summit through examining the
entanglement between domestic and international politics, characterized as a two-level
game in which national leaders participate simultaneously in both international ("Level
F') and domestic ("Level I') games. Putnam argues that the "win-set" size is particularly
affected by preferences and coalitions in the Level I negotiation (such as the cost of no-
agreement to domestic constituents, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of domestic
interests, the breadth of participation in the domestic process of ratification of
international agreements, and domestic issue linkage); by the nature of political
institutions in each country; and by the strategies of Level I negotiators (exhibiting
flexibility or tying their own hands). Putnam points out that Level I negotiators often
have poor information about the other side's domestic constraints. All of these points
have a certain resonance for settlement negotiations in WTO disputes, where information
on the other side's domestic constraints is poor, the two sides are operating under time
pressure, and the interaction between government negotiators and stakeholders can either
doom a negotiation or create unique possibilities for cooperation. As Putnam observes,
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representatives concerned, each of those representatives is simultaneously
negotiating with the private stakeholders and other concerned domestic
interests. Both levels of negotiation can be profoundly affected by domestic
law: both laws targeted at international disputes such as Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974,10 and regulatory statutes such as antidumping or health
and safety regulations. In this negotiation, government and stakeholders often
have different time horizons and different objectives. A business stakeholder
typically wants a prompt solution to its market problem; governments may
have the time and resources to do one or a chain of test cases in the WTO to
obtain legal rulings to serve larger trade policy objectives. The EC
Commission, I' for instance, brought a series of WTO disputes concerning
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, starting in 1997. The disputes
concerned export markets of little or no commercial concern to European
exporters, such as the Korean market for powdered milk; 12 the very lack of
stakeholder interest left Commission litigators with a free hand to target their
arguments. t3 In contrast, the later stages of the Bananas litigation in the
sometimes "clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments
on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives." Id. at 437.
10 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 delegates authority to the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) (originally to the President) to take retaliatory action, including
tariff increases, import restrictions or denial of service sector access authorizations,
against violations of trade agreements by a foreign country or the EU, and
"unjustifiable," "unreasonable," or "discriminatory" practices that burden or restrict U.S.
commerce. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000). Any interested person
may file a petition with the USTR under section 302 raising a claim and requesting that
such action be taken; claims now generally concern violations of the WTO Agreement.
Trade Act of 1974 § 302. If the USTR accepts the petition, he or she "initiate[s] an
investigation." Id. The statutory scheme is based on precommitment to time limits. For
instance, if the issues are covered by a trade agreement and are not resolved within its
consultation period or 150 days, whichever is earlier, the USTR must promptly request
proceedings under the agreement's "formal dispute settlement procedures." Trade Act of
1974 § 303(a)(2). Section 301 also requires the USTR to take action against trade
agreement violations in certain circumstances. Trade Act of 1974 § 301(a).
I I This Article refers to the EC because the EC is the international organization that
signed and accepted the WTO Agreement and is a Member of the WTO; the European
Union, created as a vehicle for further cooperation between the member states of the EC,
is not endowed with international legal personality. This Article uses the word
"government" to include the EC Commission.
12 Panel Report, Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy
Products, WT/DS98/R at para. 7.8 (Jan. 12, 2000).
13 These cases built the WTO jurisprudence on "unforeseen developments" and the
continuing application of Article XIX:1 of the GATT 1994 to safeguards measures, and
was criticized in ALAN SYKES, THE SAFEGUARDS MESS: A CRITIQUE OF WTO
JURISPRUDENCE (U. CHI. L. & ECON. Olin Working Paper No. 187), at
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WTO took place under a timetable agreed by the White House under
pressure from congressional leaders who had met with the most active U.S.
stakeholder company. 14
One overwhelming fact affects negotiation and all other aspects of a
WTO dispute: the remedies provided by the WTO do not include monetary
compensation to stakeholders, governments, or any party for past damage
caused by rule violations. Under Article 19.1 of the WTO Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "Dispute
Settlement Understanding," or "DSU"), when a panel or the Appellate Body
concludes that a measure is inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, "it shall
recommend" that the losing defending party "bring the measure into
conformity with that agreement." Compliance of this nature is essentially
prospective only. It is often cost-free for the defending government and its
stakeholders to delay, or to insist on the full extent of time-consuming
procedural niceties, even (or particularly) in cases where the measure
concerned is obviously WTO-illegal. As a corollary, even a large and
powerful complaining party representing a stakeholder has a powerful
incentive to seek a solution through negotiation and compromise, in the
interests of achieving a solution in the near term and not after two or more
years of WTO litigation.
Each dispute has both outputs and outcomes. 15 The outputs of a dispute
are the findings and recommendations in the panel decision, plus the
Appellate Body decision if an appeal is pursued; yet they are only one step
on the way to the outcome at the end of the story. These decisions serve to
"clarify the existing provisions of [the WTO] agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law," but do not add
to or diminish the obligations of governments under those agreements. 16 To
the extent that these decisional outputs are consistent, credible, and build the
reputation of the WTO panel and appellate process, they provide useful
guidance, and will affect bargaining positions, bargaining leverage, and the
commercial outcomes which are generally the major interest of stakeholders.
http://ssm.com/abstractid=415800.
14 Administration Yields to Demands for Action Against EU on Bananas, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Oct. 16, 1998 (discussing actions of Chiquita Brands International). A list of
the actions taken appears in Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concerning the
European Communities Regimes for the importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
64 Fed. Reg. 19,209-19,211 (Apr. 19,1999).
15 "Outcome" here is used in the same sense as "substantive outcome" in ROBERT
HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 276 (1993).
16 WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, art. 3.2 [hereinafter DSU], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu-e/dsu-e.htm#Top.
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However, the outputs in WTO disputes almost always permit more than
one possible compliance outcome, and so negotiation matters. Article 19 of
the WTO's canon of dispute settlement procedure, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, limits panels and the Appellate Body to recommending that a
sinner bring itself into compliance, and bars them from specifying how this is
to take place. 17 As a result, neither panels nor the WTO can impose a
particular dispute outcome. Unless the losing party determines its compliance
path unilaterally, the outcome has to be negotiated. 18 For example, when a
WTO arbitration panel examined the trade damage caused by the EC's
failure to comply with WTO obligations in the Banana dispute, the panel
recognized there were multiple compliance paths possible and picked one as
a reasonable benchmark for comparison. 19 In the end, the EU, the United
States and Ecuador arrived at yet another answer, a solution that was hybrid,
heterodox, and determined by negotiation. 20
Some outcomes will benefit a stakeholder in the complaining party more,
some will benefit it less, and some will not benefit the stakeholder at all. The
two WTO disputes on taxes on distilled spirits in Japan21 and Korea22
demonstrate this point. Both Japan and Korea were required to eliminate de
facto discrimination against imported spirits in their excise taxes. Japan's
compliance path led to a large tax-cut on the premium whisky sold by foreign
17 Id. at art. 19.
18 See id. at art. 19.1.
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent
with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned [i.e., the
losing party] bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to
its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the
Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
Id. The compliance obligations of WTO Members under DSU Article 21 relate to the
"recommendations and rulings" in a panel or Appellate Body report that has been
adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the WTO body that administers the DSU.
Id. at art. 21.
19 WTO, Decision by the Arbitrators, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the EC under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS27/ARB at para. 7.7 (Mar. 24, 2000). The parties to the arbitration focused
on four base "counterfactual" compliance scenarios. Id. at para. 7.4-7.5.
20 WTO, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS27/58 (Jul. 2, 2001).
21 WTO, Panel Report and Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages (hereinafter "Japan Taxes"), WT/DS8/R and WT/DS8/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996).
22 WTO, Panel Report and Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic




exporters (and domestic producers); Korea's did not. 23 After Korea complied
with the letter of its legal obligations, the tax per bottle of premium imported
whisky was still much higher than the tax on a bottle of Korean soju, and
foreign stakeholders had not solved their market access problem.
One final general consideration should be noted: the role of information
in WTO disputes. In a dispute where facts are important, gathering the
necessary facts and putting together the arguments can take months of effort.
Information that is taken for granted or easily discoverable in domestic
litigation is not necessarily easy to get when it concerns actions taken in a
foreign legal system. 24 The WTO legal obligations are not always clear, and
key information on possible choices for WTO-consistent implementation
may be unavailable until a point well after a government or a stakeholder has
committed resources to a case.
So every WTO dispute takes place between two negotiations: one
negotiation that has failed to produce compliance and another negotiation on
securing compliance after the dispute settlement process is over. It is
negotiation that will determine which of the range of possible outcomes
emerges from a WTO dispute, and when. Although the deadline for
compliance may be set by arbitration, if the losing party has not complied by
the deadline, the winning party will again be reduced to negotiating for
compliance or compensation unless it prefers retaliation. The role of
negotiation is generally underestimated-in part due to the paucity of
information available on dispute outcomes. 25 But it is often negotiation that
makes all the difference in determining the outcome at the end of the day.
23 WTO, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Mutually Acceptable Solution on
Modalities for Implementation, WT/DS8/17 (Jul. 30, 1997) and W'T/DS8/17/Add.1 (Jan.
12, 1998) (EC-Japan agreement); WTO, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Mutually
Acceptable Solution on Modalities for Implementation, WT/DS8/19 (Jan. 12, 1998)
(Japan-U.S. agreement); WTO, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Mutually
Acceptable Solution on Modalities for Implementation, WT/DS8/20 (Jan. 12, 1998)
(Canada-Japan agreement); WTO, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Status Report
by Korea, WT/DS75/18 (Jan. 17, 2000).
24 See discussion infra Part IV.F. regarding discovery of facts.
25 Full information exists on dispute outputs, in the form of the panel and Appellate
Body reports published by the WTO and posted on its Internet site. However, relatively
little organized information exists on the details of outcomes. The appendix to Prof.
Robert Hudec's ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1993), supra note 15, provides
narrative descriptions of outcomes for the GATI' period, which have been coded as a
dataset by Eric Reinhardt. Eric Reinhardt, Posturing Parliaments: Ratification,
Uncertainty and International Bargaining, ch. 4 (1996) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
Columbia University), at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/-erein/data/. Prof. Reinhardt
and Prof. Marc Busch have produced a dataset for all disputes under the GATI and many
WTO disputes with outcomes coded with the cooperation of Prof. Robert Hudec. See
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
I. NEGOTIATION IN GATT AND WTO DISPUTES: LEGAL SETrNG AND
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The WTO dispute settlement process is based on the dispute settlement
provisions of the GATT, 26 which provide for third-party settlement of
bilateral trade disputes if the complaining party has first tried and failed to
settle the dispute directly. The first paragraph of Article XXI gives any
GATT contracting party the fight "with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, [to] make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. '27 The target
of such a request must give "sympathetic consideration to the representations
or proposals made to it."'28 Each GATT contracting party has both a right to
initiate consultations and a duty to consult upon request. 29 The second
paragraph provides that if the parties do not reach a "satisfactory adjustment"
within a reasonable time, the "matter" can be referred to the collective
decision process in the GATT; after a prompt investigation, the GATT
"acting jointly" is to make "appropriate recommendations" to those
concerned, or give a ruling.30 Finally, if the GATT considered that the
circumstances were "serious enough to justify such action," it could
authorize a contracting party or parties to "suspend concessions"-giving the
legal right to impose trade retaliation-selectively against the sinner.31
As Robert Hudec's work has discussed in depth, GATT began handling
disputes at its inception and by 1949 had developed the practice of referring
Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement, in DIsPUTE PREVENTION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE TRANSATLANTIC
PARTNERSHIP (Ernst Ulrich Petersmann & Mark Pollack eds., forthcoming 2004),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/ils/publications.html. However, no
comprehensive description of outcomes exists for all WTO disputes.
26 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, arts. XXII & XXIII, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docse/legal-e/gatt47_01_e.htm [hereinafter GATT].
27 Id. at art. XXIII: 1.
28 Id.
29 ld. at art. XXII.
30 Id. at art. XXIII. Article XXIII refers to action by the "CONTRACTING
PARTIES." Article XXV: 1 of the GATiT defines "CONTRACTING PARTIES" as "the
contracting parties acting jointly." This orthographic convention was invented in order to
provide a basis for the Truman Administration to deny it was agreeing to creation of a
new international organization. SuSAN AARONSON, TRADE AND THE AMERICAN DREAM:
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR TRADE POLICY 69-72, 82-83 (1996); THOMAS W.
ZEILER, FREE TRADE, FREE WORLD: THE ADVENT OF GATT 74-84 (1999).
31 GATT, supra note 26, at art. XXII:2.
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disputes under Article XXM:2 to working parties. A working party is a
negotiating body that includes the parties interested in an issue, that does its
business by face-to-face interaction, and whose objective is agreement.32 In
the early years, almost all GATT business was conducted during month-long
sessions that took place approximately annually.33 Pushed by the GATT
Secretariat, working parties began to act like third-party adjudicators,
drawing up reports recording the views of the two disputing parties but
treating the votes of the neutral members as dispositive. 34 Starting in 1952,
the working party format mutated into a standing group of neutrals, which
would hear complaints and then draw up its report in camera with Secretariat
assistance. 35 Bit by bit, through small successes, the procedures gathered
legitimacy and began to make a difference in persuading defending
governments to remove problem measures. Dispute settlement was still a
process conducted between repeat players in an occupational community, 36
and dependent on the defending party's cooperation. 37 Very many cases were
settled bilaterally and only the hard-core cases were referred to panels.
These early years were followed by a 17-year period of decline from
1959 through 1975, attributed by Hudec to the strain put on the GATT rules
by the new environment of the 1960s. The formation of the European
Economic Community sparked a rise in preferential trade and a general
breakdown in the rules against discrimination; empirical work has
demonstrated that co-parties to a regional trade agreement were seven times
less likely to bring a GATT dispute against each other. 38 Decolonialization
and the rise in GATT's membership led to what Hudec characterizes as a
3 2 ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATr LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 78
(Butterworth Legal Publishers 1989) (1975).
33 See the list of sessions and dates in WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT
LAW AND PRACTICE 12-14 (6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL INDEX]. In 1960, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES established a Council of Representatives (the "GATr
Council"), and from 1968 until the end of the GATT in 1995, the Council handled almost
all GATT business. Id. at 1100-01.
34 HUDEC, supra note 32, at 80-81.
35 Id. at 88-89.
36 The Overview table at page 1144-45 of the ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 33,
provides a snapshot of the size of the GATT community at any given time. Before 1960,
for instance, there were only thirty-six contracting parties; as of 1977 there were seventy-
seven, as of 1981 there were 85, and as of 1990 there were one hundred. Id.
37 HUDEC, supra note 32, at 204-05.
38 Id. at 216-17; Eric Reinhardt, Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of
GATI/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948-1998, prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual
Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, Feb. 17-20, 1999, at
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/-erein/research/initiation.pdf.
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"progressive delegalization of the relationship between GATT and its
developing country members" 39 and developed countries in turn increased
the use of quotas and other restrictions on developing country imports such
as textiles. By the late 1960s, the GATT mainstream characterized dispute
settlement as undesirable, unconstructive confrontation. In an environment in
which most contracting parties were taking trade actions that were at odds
with basic GATT rules, the mainstream preferred negotiation. The exceptions
were, as Hudec points out, the developing countries and the United States:
developing countries because of their belief in their normative legal claims,
and because they were proposing rules that would only bind others; and the
United States because it was the only major actor whose post-1960 trade
policy had not moved away from the liberal model reflected in the 1947
GATT text.40
During this period, even panels pushed disputants into conciliation mode.
For instance, in the Dollar Banana case of the early 1970s, the United States
attacked United Kingdom import quotas that discriminated against bananas,
citrus, rum, and cigars from the "dollar area" of the United States and Latin
America. The panel issued an "interim" report which reviewed the
commercial impact of the quota, noted that the United Kingdom had
conceded that the quota violated GATT Article XI, "strongly requested the
parties concerned to seek a mutually acceptable solution to the problem" that
would take into account the dependence on the U.K. market of Caribbean
citrus exporters, and set a deadline of a month for such a solution. 41 Two
months later the parties notified the GATT Director-General that they had
settled the case and that the United States had withdrawn its complaint.42
The outlines of GATT dispute settlement in its final form emerged
during the Tokyo Round negotiations of the 1970s, the first time that dispute
settlement itself was a topic of negotiation. The Tokyo Round produced both
a set of non-tariff barrier codes with new, more automatic dispute settlement
procedures, and a "framework agreement" consisting of a negotiated
restatement of GATT practice in the area.43 But as of 1980, the basic
39 HUDEC, supra note 32, at 229.
40 Id. at 250.
41 GATr, Interim Panel Report, United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, Apr. 30,
1973, GAIT B.I.S.D. (20th Supp.) at 230-36 (1973) [hereinafter Dollar Banana case].
42 Id. at 236-37, para. 5; see HUDEC, supra note 32, at 259 (stating that the
settlement provided a timetable for removing quotas on all the products directly of
interest to the United States (i.e., citrus but not bananas)).
43 GATr, Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Annex on Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in
the Field of Dispute Settlement, Art. XXII:2, Nov. 28, 1979, GATr B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 210 (1979).
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elements of GATT dispute settlement remained the same as in 1952. A
contracting party could refer a matter for investigation under GATT Article
XXIH:2 but establishment of a working party, or of a panel, required a
collective decision. When the panel process was completed and the panel had
circulated a report proposing rulings and recommendations, those proposals
had no official status until adopted by a collective decision. Finally, only a
collective decision could authorize trade retaliation. While the GATT
nominally provides for decisionmaking by vote with one vote per contracting
party (and early disputes were decided by vote),44 after 1957 no GATT
decision was taken other than by consensus.45 By blocking consensus, a
defending party could prevent establishment of the panel, block adoption of
an unfavorable panel report and block authorization of retaliation.
Conditional threats to block could be used to obtain terms of reference for a
panel proceeding that would limit the scope of the dispute46 or provide
special procedures to accommodate concerns of major players.47 The specter
of defendant blockage created a persistent reputation problem for GATT,
captured in the House Ways and Means Committee's description of the
reasons for enacting authority to retaliate unilaterally under Section 301:
44 See, for example, the Czechoslovak-U.S dispute on U.S. export controls,
discussed in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 33, at 602, decision in BISD Vol. II at 28,
complaint rejected by roll-call vote 17-1 with 3 abstentions, GATT Doc.
GAIT/CP.3/SR.22.
45 ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 33 at 1099. The literature on international
organizations shows that particularly since the mid-1960s, consensus decisionmaking has
become dominant in many organizations whose constitutions nominally provide for
voting. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELs M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 783-85 (1999); C. Wilfred Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted
Voting, Special and Simple Majorities and Consensus as Methods of Decision in
International Organisations, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-63
(1965).
46 See e.g., GATT, Unadopted Panel Report, U.S.-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,
LJ6053 paras. 5.1-5.3. The United States blocked the establishment of a panel to examine
Nicaragua's GATT complaint against the 1985 U.S. trade embargo on Nicaragua. Id. The
blockage was only lifted when Nicaragua consented to special terms of reference stating
that "the Panel cannot examine or judge the validity or motivation for the invocation of
Article XXI(b)(iii) by the United States." Id.
47 The EEC used blockage of panel establishment to obtain rights of full
participation for Mediterranean preference receiving countries in the Citrus dispute
brought by the United States against the EEC in 1983. See Stint. of Panel Chair, GATT
Doc. C/M/168 (1983) at 5. The United States also used blockage to obtain full rights to
participate in the EEC dispute against Japan's implementation of the U.S.-Japan
agreement on semiconductor trade. See Document Detailing Panel Composition and
Terms of Reference, GAT Doc. C/M/208 (1987), at 14.
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Your committee is particularly concerned that the decisionmaking
process in the GATT is such as to make it impossible in practice for the
United States to obtain a determination with respect to certain practices of
our trading partners which appear to be clear violations of the
GATT .... So long as decisions in the GATT are made on the basis of
political consensus of the contracting parties, the United States will have no
assurance that questions of consistency with the GATT will be resolved
impartially. The committee believes that it is essential for the United States
to be able to act unilaterally in any situation where it is unable to obtain
redress through the GATT against practices which discriminate against or
unreasonably impair U.S. export opportunities. 48
There followed the turbulent 1980s, a decade in which the United States
brought a series of high-profile legal complaints against the EEC,
characterized by long delays in establishing the panel, protracted panel
proceedings, panel reports widely considered to have quality problems, and
blocking of adoption of panel reports. During the same period, as the dollar
rose and rose, so did the volume of protectionist legislative proposals in
Congress, with tacit backing from an exporting business community that had
lost its patience. The pressure led to enactment in 1988 of "Super 301," 4 9 an
overlay on Section 301's investigation provisions that required the executive
branch to compile a list of trade sinners in 1989 and 1990 and initiate Section
301 investigations against the trade barriers of each listed sinner. The same
legislation mandated dispute settlement reform as the number one specific
objective for the United States in the Uruguay Round. 50 The 1989 and 1990
Super 301 process, handled by an Administration steering gingerly between
Congress and the GATT, still provoked a reaction so severe that it made
Section 301 a major target in the Uruguay Round and helped turn the EC into
a backer of multilateral dispute settlement.
The Uruguay Round finally produced the DSU, an agreement largely
negotiated between the United States and the EU and within the "Quad" 5 1
countries, with important interventions by the developing countries. Binding
third-party dispute settlement was an objective of many in the GATT, not
just the United States. In 1989, as part of an "early harvest" of interim results
from the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT Council approved an
48 H.R. REP. No. 93-571, at 66-67 (1973), cited at HUDEC, supra note 32, at 262.
49 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-418 (Aug. 23, 1988). This
authority expired in 1990.
50 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § l1 01(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2901
(2000).
51 Canada, EU, Japan and United States.
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interim package of dispute settlement improvements, 52 which was put into
force immediately on a provisional basis. The package gave any GATT
contracting party the right to a panel to hear its complaint.
Negotiations then moved forward, resulting in 1991 in the key tradeoff
that created the final WTO dispute settlement rules. The United States and
others who wanted an effective dispute settlement process succeeded in
gaining agreement to rules that eliminated blockage. Any party that could not
settle a dispute after consultations could have the dispute referred to a panel
by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the body administering the DSU.
This referral would take place unless there was consensus otherwise. The
same "negative consensus" rule would apply to DSB decisions to adopt panel
and Appellate Body reports and to authorize suspension of concessions upon
request. In exchange for accepting this "automaticity" 53 in dispute settlement,
the EC gained agreement to the text of DSU Article 23, curbing unilateral
determinations condemning measures before completion of multilateral
dispute settlement.
The final step was to link the dispute settlement rules with the new trade
organization being created to administer the Uruguay Round agreements.
The GATT dispute settlement system still provides the basic structure for
WTO dispute settlement. The DSU rules govern dispute settlement
procedure, but the elements of a claim (the cause of action) are provided by
each of the covered agreements itself. And most of those agreements simply
refer to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the GATT. 54
The DSU text was not perfect; it could have been predicted that WTO
litigants and panels would end up consuming much time and effort on issues
the negotiators barely discussed, and vice versa. Negotiators were so aware
of this fact that they built in a review of the DSU, and mandated that the
review be carried out four years after entry into force of the new rules. The
52 GATT, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
Apr. 29, 1989, GAIT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989).
53 U.S. negotiators' attempts to remove collective decisionmaking from the process
(for instance, by having a panel started by filing a request, as in court) had met with no
sympathy.
54 See e.g., WTO, Agreement on Safeguards, art. 14, at http://www.wto.org/ english/
tratop-e/safeg e/safeint.htm (SG Agreement) ("The provisions of Articles XXII and
XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding
shall apply to consultations and settlement of disputes arising under this Agreement.").
This formula is used in the new agreements drafted in the Uruguay Round--except for
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the provisions on textile disputes in the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and the special remedy provisions for prohibited
and actionable subsidies in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
The covered agreements that existed before the Uruguay Round generally retained their
pre-existing cause-of-action provisions.
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DSU review then took place between 1997 and 1999, ending at the Seattle
Ministerial Meeting of 1999. The Ministerial Declaration of November 2001,
which launched the Doha Development Agenda talks, then provided for
renewed negotiations on dispute settlement with a deadline of May 31,
2003,55 which has now been extended until May 31, 2004.56
IV. NEGOTIATION IN PRACTICE: BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER A WTO
DISPUTE
We turn now to a description of the role of settlement negotiations in a
typical WTO dispute. This picture is intended to provide a material basis for
the discussion of models below.
A. Dispute Types
WTO disputes, like GATT disputes, can be divided into two types:
stakeholder cases and policy cases. 57 Most disputes are focused on particular
products, and often involve specific stakeholder interests whose primary
focus is on commercial outcomes. Some are essentially government-initiated,
may be brought against a measure without reference to its product impact,
and are motivated by issues of principle; the government may have as its
objective the establishment of a legal precedent rather than any particular
commercial outcome. The structure and dynamics of negotiations and
settlement will obviously differ depending on which type of dispute is
involved. Even in a product-focused dispute, only the government can
initiate formal WTO dispute proceedings, and the government is ultimately
responsible for all arguments presented. The government may act both as an
agent of a stakeholder principal and as a principal itself; in a government-
initiated dispute there may be no private stakeholder and thus agent and
principal merge.
For a stakeholder focused on market access, the most important fact is
the lack of compensation to stakeholders for past damage in the WTO.
Stakeholder complaints may be of any size, and many are surprisingly small.
The only requirement is that they are important enough to someone who is
55 WTO, Ministerial Declaration of November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, at para.
30 (Nov. 20, 2001).
56 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Formally Endorse Deadline Extension for Dispute
Talks, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Jul. 29, 2003, at A4.
57 HUDEC, supra note 32, at 103-05 (noting the same pattern in GATT disputes
brought during the 1950s).
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important enough. 58 In such cases, the litigating government may be
dependent on the stakeholder for information necessary to frame the legal
complaint and target settlement negotiations. Settlement discussions will be a
full two-level negotiation in which a stakeholder who has power relative to
its government has a major effect on the government's ability to settle the
case. These same considerations apply when the government is defending a
measure that affects the interests of politically important stakeholders- such
as an antidumping order that protects the steel industry or a regulation that
discriminates in favor of domestic producers.
Policy cases, on the other hand, are brought for reasons of principle, with
low stakeholder involvement or with overwhelmingly strong governmental
direction. In this category fall the EC safeguards cases discussed above and
the WTO and GATT disputes concerning the trade measures based on
national security claims, such as the EU-U.S. dispute concerning the Helms-
Burton Act,59 complaints by Colombia and Honduras regarding Nicaraguan
trade sanctions imposed in a border dispute,60 or Nicaragua's GATT case
against the U.S. trade embargo imposed in 1985.61 If the stakes in a policy
case are symbolic, if the objective is to obtain a panel report, or if the only
acceptable outcome is removal of the offending measure (and this will not
occur without a WTO decision), political disputes may be particularly
difficult to settle. In the absence of a stakeholder with a financial interest in
early settlement, the government may have no incentive to have a bargaining
position oriented toward settlement.
58 For example, the GATT complaint by the United States in 1988 against Norway's
quantitative restrictions on imports of apples and pears was brought in response to a
request by Oregon and Washington fruit exporters supported by Senator Packwood, who
was then chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Finance. The
panel report was useful in the Uruguay Round agricultural talks but was ultimately worth
less than $500,000 in trade. Both the annex on GATT disputes, HUDEC, supra note 15,
and the annex on Section 301 investigations, 1974-94, THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY
ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994), show that
individual trade disputes can have a remarkably small dollar value, particularly in relation
to the effort expended.
59 WTO, United States-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS3811,
May 13, 1996, (1996) (EC complaint against United States regarding Pub. L. No. 104-
114).
60 WTO, Nicaragua-Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and Colombia,
WT/DS 188/1, Jan. 17, 2000 (complaint by Colombia); WT/DS 188/2, Apr. 7, 2000 (panel
request by Colombia); WT/DS201/1, June 6, 2000 (complaint by Honduras).
61 GATT, Unadopted Panel Report, United States-Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua, supra note 46.
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B. Before the Dispute
Trade disputes do exist outside the WTO and before going to the WTO,
and discussions on settlement very often take place in those contexts. Every
government has a web of connections in which complaints can be raised:
trade summits, official visits, bilateral or multilateral meetings at the WTO,
or lower-key contacts. These arenas can be, and often are, used to negotiate a
quick settlement, or to determine that settlement is not possible without the
normative leverage of formal WTO proceedings. For this reason, the
universe of WTO-focused disputes is substantially larger than the universe of
disputes where WTO procedures have been invoked through a formal
consultation request. Since every WTO-focused dispute that does not surface
in a consultation request has been settled or withdrawn, statistics on
settlement based solely on recorded WTO complaints greatly understate both
the extent of settlement occurring under the shadow of WTO rules and the
proportion of all disputes that are settled. A dispute generally does not reach
the stage of a formal, visible request for WTO consultations unless it could
not be settled bilaterally, or there was no realistic hope of settling it without
formal proceedings.
C. Notice
A dispute starts to exist for WTO purposes when one Member requests
consultations with another Member, under Article 4.2 of the DSU. The
formal requirements for a request are provided in DSU Article 4.4: the
request must be in writing, must give the reasons including identification of
the measures at issue and the legal basis for the complaint, and must be
notified to the WTO by the requesting Member. These requirements were an
innovation of the DSU and ensure that all disputes will be visible to all
Members. 62
Identification of the problem in the consultation request is important both
for legal and practical reasons. Under the terms of Article XXIII,
"representations or proposals" must have been made before a complainant
can request third-party adjudication by a panel (actual consultations are not
62 In the GATT era before 1989, the first required notice was a panel request; a
disputant could request consultations orally or through bilateral correspondence not
disclosed to the GATT and raise and settle a GATT dispute entirely outside the historical
record. Thus, the underreporting of settlement that exists in the WTO was even more
severe under the GATT. If the propensity to settlement is constant under both regimes,
and the only change is introduction of reporting rules that bias reported disputes toward
those that are less likely to settle, it can be expected that reported (as opposed to true)
settlement rates under the WTO will decline compared to the GATT era.
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required if the defending party refuses to consult). 63 The measure referred to
a panel must have been the subject of at least a consultation request, although
that measure may include later implementing rules. 64 The requirement for
identification in a consultation request cannot apply to each claim, since
consultations are legitimately a learning process and can lead to additional
legal claims about a measure. 65 Practically speaking, it is useful to clearly
identify the measures and issues in a consultation request because this
document communicates the issues to stakeholders in the disputing parties
and elsewhere, and to members of other WTO delegations who may later
become panelists.
D. Bilateral vs. Plurilateral Consultations
DSU Article 4.4 also requires that a consultation request identify whether
the consultations are requested under GATT Article XXII (or its analogues
in other covered WTO agreements), or GATT Article XXII (or its
analogues). A request under either Article XXII or Article XXIII provides a
sufficient legal basis for a later panel request. 66 If one Member requests
63 GATT, Panel Report, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIH, Nov. 16 1962,
GATT B.I.S.D. (11 th Supp.) at 95, 98 para. 5 (1962). The concept of a right to request a
panel even when the defending party refuses to consult was first accepted in 1985, when
Nicaragua requested a panel after the United States had refused to consult regarding the
U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua. GATT docs. L/5847 (Nicaraguan panel request),
C/M191, C/M1192 (Council minutes), cited in ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 33, at
672. This right is now codified in DSU Article 4.3, which permits a complaining party
immediately to request a panel if the defending party does not respond to a consultation
request or does not enter into consultations within thirty days.
64 WTO, Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 132 (Aug. 20, 1999); WTO, Appellate Body Report,
Chile-Agricultural Products (Price Band), WT/DS207/AB/R, paras. 126-27, 135 (Sept.
23, 2002); WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Measures on Certain
Products from the European Communities, WT/DS 165/AB/R, paras. 70, 82 (Jan. 10,
2001).
65 See WTO, Panel Report and Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, para. 7.9 (Apr. 14, 1999) (cited with approval at
WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 132 (Aug. 2, 1999)):
One purpose of consultations, as set forth in Article 4.3 of the SCM Agreement, is to
clarify the facts of the situation, and it can be expected that information obtained
during the course of consultations may enable the complainant to focus the scope of
the matter with respect to which it seeks establishment of a panel.
66 Use of an Article XXH request as a basis for a panel request was accepted under
the GATT as far back as the 1950s, reflecting the history of negotiation in the GATT's
consultation and dispute settlement provisions. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 33, at
674. The provisions on consultations in DSU Article 4 treat all consultation requests the
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consultations with another Member under Article XXIII, no other Member
has the right to participate in the consultations. Because of this feature, a
government initiating dispute settlement with the intention of seeking a
negotiated settlement or negotiated compliance, or otherwise seeking to be
alone with the defending government, will normally use the Article XXIII
track.67 It is possible for a group of countries to request a single consultation
under Article XXIII, as the complaining parties did in the WTO Bananas
litigation. 68
GATT Article XXII is entitled "consultation," not "dispute settlement. '69
Article XXII:I requires "sympathetic consideration" and provision of
opportunities to consult about representations by another party "with respect
to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement," even without any
legal claim of violation.70 Before the mid-1980s, Article XXII consultations
were often used as a means to sit down and talk about a problem without any
claims of legal violation.71
But the distinctive characteristic of Article XXII consultations in the
WTO era has been the opportunity they provide for participation by other
Members, transforming a bilateral consultation into a group discussion with
the complaining party and a group of its allies. Article XXII: 1 was first used
for plurilateral discussions in the late 1950s as a solution to the problem of
collectively dealing with the trade problems from formation of the EEC.72 In
same regardless of whether they are based on Article XXII or Article XXIII.
67 See, e.g., WTO, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry Products,
WT/DS100/1, Aug. 25, 1997 (consultation request under Article XXIII by European
Communities regarding U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety Inspection Service
ban on imports of EC-origin poultry products; the case was settled after consultations,
and imports resumed).
68 See WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/1, Feb. 13, 1996 (consultation request by five
complaining parties under Article XXIII). The request was made under Article XXIII
because Article XXII consultations would have been joined by the countries benefiting
from EC banana preferences, with the consent of the EC. In a 1993 GATT dispute
concerning U.S. mixing requirements for tobacco, ten countries held a joint Article XXIII
consultation with the United States. GATT Doc. C/M1267 at 10 (1993), cited in GAT
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 33, at 671.
69 GAT', supra note 26, at art. XXII.
7 0 Id. at art. XXII. 1.
71 Marc Busch, Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under
GATT, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 425, 439 (2000) (finding that under GATT, complaints
under Article XXIH. 1 were 40% more likely to escalate to a panel).
72 The GATT Analytical Index provides a full explanation of the historical
background. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 33, at 612-13. When the GATT first
discussed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Part IV of the Treaty gave rise to intense
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the late 1980s, the plurilateral aspect of Article XXII consultations was used
so often that the Uruguay Round negotiators of the DSU generalized the
GATT Article XXII: I rules and applied them to other covered WTO
agreements. Article 4.11 of the DSU provides that when a request for
consultations under GATT Article XXII:I (or an analogous provision in
another covered agreement) is circulated, any other Member that has a
substantial trade interest in the consultations may ask to participate in the
consultations, within ten days after the date that the consultation request is
circulated. If the defending Member agrees 73 that the claim of substantial
trade interest is well founded, the requesting Member can participate in the
consultations. If not,74 the requesting Member is free to request consultations
opposition by Commonwealth and Latin developing countries, which would lose
European markets for their commodity products to the colonies and ex-colonies of the
EEC-6. Discussions on Part IV could not be closed out and continued in the GATT
Intersessional Committee. Eventually, as a means of moving forward, it was agreed to
indefinitely put aside the question of the Treaty's consistency with GATI Article XXIV
and focus instead on the concrete market problems. The vehicle used for consultations on
these problems was Article XXII. See The European Economic Community, Nov. 29,
1957, GATT B.I.S.D. (6th Supp.) at 89-104 (working party report on the Rome Treaty)
(discussion of Part IV); The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Nov. 29, 1957, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 69-71 (report on discussions in the
Intersessional Committee). In this connection, procedures were agreed upon to provide
the option of wider participation in a consultation under Article XXII. Any contracting
party requesting a consultation under Article XXII was to inform the GA'T for the
information of all other contracting parties. Any other contracting party asserting a
"substantial trade interest" could ask to participate in the consultations, and would "be
joined in the consultation" if the defending contracting party or parties agreed that the
claim of substantial interest was well founded. At the end of the consultation, the
participants were to inform the GATT of the outcome. Procedures under Article XXII on
Questions Affecting the Interests of a Number of Contracting Parties [hereinafter
Procedures], Nov. 10, 1958, GAT' B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 24 (procedures adopted on
Nov. 10, 1958). Compliance with this decision's notification requirements was spotty
until the 1989 Improvements, supra note 52, and remained imperfect through 1994.
73 This provision of Article 4.11 was based on the 1958 Procedures, supra note 72,
where it responded to concerns of the EEC.
74 For instance, when the EC, Japan, and the United States each requested
consultations in 1996 under Article XXII with Indonesia about the Indonesian National
Car Program, each requested participation in the others' consultations, as did Canada and
Korea. See documents for Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54 (complaint by EC), WT/DS55 and WT/DS64 (complaints by Japan),
and WT/DS59 (complaint by United States), July 2, 1998. Indonesia refused to permit the
complaining parties to attend each others' consultations. WTO, Dispute Settlement
Body-3 December 1996-Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/27, item 3 (Dec. 3, 1996).
Eventually, the claims of all three were heard by a joint panel. See WTO, Panel Report,
Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS54/R (July 2,
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on its own under Article XXII or XXIII (or their analogues) and if it does,
will not be required to demonstrate substantial trade interest. An Article
XXII-type consultation may end up as a large meeting with a substantial
number of delegations in the room, particularly if the parties include the EC.
The procedural choice between Article XXII and Article XXII as a
vehicle provides an opportunity to signal a desire to talk settlement, or
instead, to enhance the leverage of a single disputant by soliciting attendance
by others who are supportive and to build coalitions. An Article XXII
consultation provides a stage on which to pillory a Member with an
unpopular measure; if it is already clear that no change will be made without
a panel decision, the consultation process at least provides an opportunity to
mobilize public opinion. In theory, disputes where the consultations are
solely conducted under Article XXII should be less likely to settle. Busch
and Reinhardt's empirical analyses of WTO dispute settlement do not reach
this issue but they do find that involvement of multiple complainants,
whether planned for or not, reduces the likelihood that the defending party
will make concessions. 75
E. Consultations
The DSU requires Members to enter into consultations promptly in good
faith, with a view to achieving a mutually satisfactory solution.76
Consultations customarily take place in Geneva, between the parties (and
sometimes, interested third parties) with no WTO Secretariat or other referee
present to mediate or create an official record. They can take days or involve
a series of meetings over a long period if serious settlement talks are
1998).
75 Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 7, at 156. However, nothing prevents the
complaining party from sitting down with the defending party informally and reaching a
settlement that way.
76 DSU, supra note 16, at art. 4.3. In the 1996 dispute on Brazil-Measures
Affecting Desiccated Coconut, Brazil refused to consult under the WTO Agreement
(since it argued that the dispute was subject only to the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code).
The panel refused to rule on claims by the Philippines under DSU Articles 4.3 and 4.6,
which were outside its terms of reference, but it noted in obiter dicta that:
The Philippines's request concerns a matter which this Panel views with the
utmost seriousness. Compliance with the fundamental obligation of WTO Members
to enter into consultations where a request is made under the DSU is vital to the
operation of the dispute settlement system .... In our view, these provisions make
clear that Members' duty to consult is absolute, and is not susceptible to the prior
imposition of any terms and conditions by a Member.




involved. But if both sides see the consultations as a box to be checked
before requesting a panel, consultations may be over in less than an hour.
The format and contents are entirely determined by the parties. DSU Article
4.6 provides that consultations are to be confidential and without prejudice to
the rights of any Member in further proceedings. Accordingly, offers to settle
a case cannot be used later to argue that the defending Member admitted a
violation. 77
F. Discovery
The complaining party may use the consultations to clarify the facts
concerning the measure in question, and the defending party may try to
persuade the complaining party that it has no factual case. Both sides may
also try to probe for the legal theories that the other party will use. However,
nothing other than self-interest compels either side to reveal any of its cards.
Since consultations are unsupervised, a complaining party is on its own in
gathering the facts for a case.
A complaining party must be ready with enough facts when and if it
moves forward to a panel proceeding, and consultations are the only form of
pre-panel discovery that exists. During the GATT era, disputes only rarely
concerned facts other than the facts of a party's legal measure or facts in the
record of an administrative proceeding. Panels generally avoided making any
findings on the weight of parties' factual presentations, dodging such
evaluations through the use of presumptions and other legal rules. 78 But there
are a range of WTO obligations that depend on what the facts are regarding
77 The 1996 dispute on United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-
Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/R (Nov. 8, 1996), concerned a U.S. textile restriction
which had been the subject of lengthy bilateral discussions. Costa Rica argued that after
making a finding that imports at the level of 14.4 million dozen per year were causing
serious damage to the U.S. domestic industry, the U.S. authorities engaged in bilateral
negotiations with Costa Rica in which U.S. negotiators offered guaranteed access for 21.5
million dozen conditional on use of U.S. fabric. Costa Rica then argued that in light of
these offers, the restriction was motivated by protection of U.S. textile makers, not the
industry making the like product. Id. at para. 5.16. The panel found:
In our view, the wording of Article 4.6 of the DSU makes it clear that offers
made in the context of consultations are, in case a mutually agreed solution is not
reached, of no legal consequence to the later stages of dispute settlement, as far as
the rights of the parties to the dispute are concerned. Consequently, we will not base
our findings on such information.
Id. at para. 7.27.
78 See, e.g., the GAT'T panel decision applying presumptions to the factual disputes
regarding the application of GATT Article XI.2(c), in Japan-Restrictions on Imports of
Certain Agricultural Products, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1988).
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issues such as the qualities of a product, or what steps a government took,
and complaining parties no longer shrink from bringing cases under such
provisions. Panels and the Appellate Body have evolved legal rules on the
burden of proof of facts, and panels have found often enough that the
complaining party did not meet its burden; moreover, since DSU 17.6 limits
appeals to issues of law, a panel's determination regarding the facts cannot
be appealed. A panel can ask a party to disclose facts to the other side,79 but
only the complaining party can argue its case. A panel cannot help a party
that has not presented enough facts and arguments to meet its burden of
proof.80
G. Settlements
As noted above, if a dispute can be settled bilaterally, it probably will not
reach the level of a request for WTO dispute settlement; WTO consultation
requests therefore select disputes that are inherently more difficult to settle
by agreement. However, settlement by negotiation does happen sometimes
during consultations, or later in a dispute. Settlement may consist of
elimination of the measure, phased-in compliance under shelter of a waiver
79 See, e.g., Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather, WT/DS 126/R, at paras. 6.1-6.14 (May 25, 1999) (requesting copies
of loan and grant contracts between Australian government and Howe Leather Co., report
by KPMG accountants used in determining compensation arrangements for Howe,
correspondence between the Australian government and Howe regarding performance
targets under the grant contract, and documents indicating the legal basis for the grant
and loan under Australian law); see also id. para. 4.1 (regarding special procedures for
treatment of business confidential information by panel and parties).
80 WTO, Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/AB/R, at paras. 120-31 (Mar. 19, 1999). The panel had found that the
Japanese varietal testing requirement violated Article 5.6 of the Agreement on
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures because alternative measures
(determination of sorption levels) existed that provided some level of protection and were
less trade-restrictive. Id. The Appellate Body reversed because the panel finding was
based on testimony of experts advising the panel, and the complaining party (United
States) had not claimed that determination of sorption levels was a measure meeting
requirements of Article 5.6. According to the Appellate Body:
[P]anels have a significant investigative authority. However, this authority cannot be
used by a panel to rule in favour of a complaining party which has not established a
prima facie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims asserted by it. A
panel is entitled to seek information and advice from experts and from any other
relevant source it chooses ... to help it to understand and evaluate the evidence
submitted and the arguments made by the parties, but not to make the case for a
complaining party.
Id. at para. 129.
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of obligations, 81 or other trades of benefits. 82 The DSU requires that
settlements are notified to the WTO, but compliance with this requirement
has not been universal; notifications do not always include details, and there
is no means of checking that a notification has not omitted a relevant point.
A case may also be settled when the complaining party abandons some
or all of its claims after it discovers that the claims lack sufficient factual
basis, the measure no longer exists, or the legal arguments supporting the
claim are not likely to prevail. A defending party may be able to persuade the
complaining party that success in litigation will be more difficult than
predicted, that success in litigation may be fruitless, or that a practical
solution to the trade problem at issue is better achieved through a negotiated
solution. Since there is usually more than one way to comply with a given
WTO obligation, it may be entirely rational to abandon a claim if the
complaining party believes that it cannot prevent the defending party from
complying in a manner that is useless to the stakeholder. In another variation,
a defending party may change its law to provide the same protection in a
manner that it believes is more defensible.83 Claim abandonment may also,
of course, reflect pure arm-twisting and pressure politics.
81 See WTO, Hungary-Export Subsidies in Respect of Agricultural Products,
WT/DS35/1 (Mar. 27, 1996). After discussions in the WTO Committee on Agriculture,
consultations with six agricultural exporting Members, and establishment of a panel, the
interested Members agreed with Hungary on a program to bring its export subsidies into
conformity with its Uruguay Round commitments over time and a waiver to provide legal
shelter until Dec. 31, 2001. Id.; see also WTO, Waiver Decision, Hungary-Agreement
on Agriculture, WT/L/238 (Oct. 29, 1997).
82 When India brought a complaint of discrimination by Poland against its
automobile exports in 1995, WTO, Poland-Import Regime for Automobiles,
WT/DS19/1 (Sept. 28, 1995), the settlement reached provided for the establishment by
Poland of a reduced-rate tariff rate quota for automobiles with engines of up to 996 cc,
originating in developing countries benefiting from Poland's GSP tariff preferences.
WTO, Poland-Import Regime for Automobiles-Notification of Mutually Agreed
Solution, W'1/DS19/2 (Sept. 11, 1996). Poland's GSP scheme was limited to countries
with a GDP per capita lower than Poland, and thus excluded Korea, the major exporter of
automobiles in this size class.
83 For instance, when challenged in the WTO regarding the legality of its minimum
specific duties on imports of footwear in 1996-97, Argentina revoked the duties on
footwear and on the same day initiated a safeguard investigation and imposed provisional
safeguard measures on footwear in the form of minimum specific duties. WTO, Appellate
Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
WT/DS121/AB/R, at para. 2 (Dec. 14, 1999). Similarly, after the EC requested a panel
regarding Chile's taxes on distilled spirits, Chile revised the taxes; after the EC pursued a
complaint against the revised tax system, the panel found that the new tax "fits in a
logical connection with existing and previous systems of de jure discrimination against
imports." WTO, Panel Report, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/R at
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DSU Article 5 does provide for good offices, conciliation, or mediation
if the parties to a dispute agree-implicitly limiting these forms of settlement
to situations in which a complainant has already committed itself to bringing
a dispute. A July 2001 proposal from the WTO Director-General for
procedures to operationalize Article 5 noted that Article 5 had never been
used. 84 There has still been no mediation to date within a dispute. The only
known mediation to date, regarding EC preferences for canned tuna,
occurred instead of dispute settlement proceedings. The mediation
successfully settled the differences between the parties, due to a number of
factors: the use of unique leverage by the complainants to get the EC's
attention to their problem, 85 skilled mediation by a veteran dealmaker who
paras. 1.2-1.5, 2.1-2.7, & 7.159, WT/DSll0/R (June 15, 1999). These are examples
involving substitute measures that were still challenged and found to violate WTO
obligations; in other cases a change in legislation eliminated the violation or otherwise
convinced the complaining party to abandon its claims.
84 WTO, Article 5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding-Communication from
the Director-General, WT/DSB/25 (Jul. 17, 2001). The proposal called for direct
involvement of the Director-General or a Deputy Director-General; their role would be
explicitly non-juridical.
Legal conclusions regarding a particular dispute are best left to the formal dispute
settlement process. Rather, Article 5 proceedings should be seen more as efforts to
assist in reaching a mutually agreed solution. It should also be recalled that Article
25 provides for Arbitration and the Director-General does not wish to encroach upon
this provision of the DSU.
Id. at 3. Requests under Article 5 could only be made after commencement of a formal
dispute and would have to specify which form of settlement was requested. Id. at 5. The
proposal characterized "good offices" as overseeing of logistical and Secretariat support,
"conciliation" involving direct participation by the Director-General (or Deputy) in
negotiations, and "mediation," including the possibility of actually proposing solutions, if
appropriate. Id. at n. 9.
85 In 2001, the EC requested a WTO waiver for the tariff preferences in its proposed
Partnership Agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. The ACP
states threatened to block the launch of a new round of trade negotiations unless this
waiver was approved. During the examination of the waiver request, Thailand objected to
the impact of the preferences on Thai canned tuna exports to the EC, which would face a
32% MFN tariff while ACP tuna would be duty-free. WTO, Questions from Thailand
Regarding the Request for a WTO Waiver Concerning the New ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement, G/C/W/323 (Oct. 19, 2001). Under the consensus decisionmaking procedures
applicable to waivers, Thailand could threaten to block the preferences unless its
concerns were satisfied. Although Article IX:3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the W'TO provides for approval of waivers by vote, in 1995, the WTO General Council
adopted an agreed statement providing for decisions on waivers by consensus. WTO,
Decision-Making Procedures Under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement,
Statement by the Chairman as agreed by the General Council on 15 November 1993,
WT/U93 (Nov. 24, 1995). During the Doha Ministerial Meeting, the EC finally cleared
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suggested a practical solution, 86 goodwill on the part of the EC in promptly
implementing the solution increasing the complainants' market access,87 and
the fact that the problem was framed not in terms of legal rights but as a
question of impairment of interests.88
H. Panel Proceedings
After the consultation/waiting period is over, the complaining party may
request a panel. But this does not close the door on settlement negotiations. A
panel request may simply signal greater seriousness and set a deadline for
the way for approval of the waiver and the launch of the Doha Round by providing a
letter from EC Commissioner Pascal Lamy agreeing to consultations with Thailand on
this issue and mediation if the consultations did not settle the matter. WTO,
Communication from Thailand With Respect to the Waiver Application for the New ACP-
EC Partnership Agreement, G/C/W/344 (Nov. 27, 2001) (including text of letter from
Pascal Lamy agreeing to consultations to be completed by April 20, 2002 and mediation
as provided under DSU Article 5). After three rounds of consultations, the Philippines,
Thailand, and the EC requested mediation on September 4, 2002 concerning the extent to
which the legitimate interests of the Philippines and Thailand were being impaired by
preferenctial tuna tariffs and the means by which this situation could be addressed. W1O,
Request for Mediation by Philippines, Thailand and the European Communities,
WT/GC/66 (Oct. 16, 2002) (concerning request for mediation, terms of reference for
mediation, appointment of Deputy Director-General Rufus Yerxa, and procedures to be
used). The parties chose to use procedures similar to the 2001 Article 5 procedures, supra
note 77.
86 The mediation was carried out by WTO Deputy Director-General Rufus Yerxa,
who proposed a solution to the parties on December 20. WTO, Request for Mediation by
Philippines, Thailand and the European Communities-Addendum, WT/GC/66/Add.1
(Dec. 23, 2002).
87 On June 5, 2003, the EC adopted a regulation implementing the proposed
solution: a tariff-rate quota for non-preferential imports of tuna at an in-quota duty rate of
12%. Ninety-nine percent of the amount was allocated to Thailand, the Philippines, and
Indonesia on the basis of past imports. Council Regulation (EC) No. 975/2003 of 5 June
2003 opening and providing for the administration of quota for imports of canned tuna
covered by CN codes 1604 14 11, 1604 14 18, and 1604 20 70, 2003 O.J. (L 141/1).
88 The Lamy letter in G/C/W/344, supra note 78, agreed to consultations to
"examine the extent to which the legitimate interests of Thailand are being unduly
impaired as a result of the implementation of the preferential tariff treatment for canned
tuna originating in ACP states and consider means by which the legitimate interests of
Thailand may be addressed." The later request for mediation had the same terms of
reference. WT/GC/66, supra note 78. The waiver for the ACP/EC Partnership made it
impossible to claim that the EC's preferential tariff treatment of ACP tuna violated the
GATT's most-favored nation clause.
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settlement. 89 For instance, in 1996, a U.S. complaint against the EC's
implementation of its Uruguay Round tariff concessions on rice and other
grains was settled just before the DSB meeting that was to establish the
panel; EC delays in implementing the deal resulted in two additional U.S.
panel requests, each withdrawn.90
Even establishment of a panel does not prevent settlement negotiations,
for panel establishment begins the process of selecting panelists through
discussion between the parties and the Secretariat. Panel selection can take
months even if the parties are willing, and it is the chief source of avoidable
delay in WTO dispute settlement. Since any party can cut off the selection
process after twenty days have gone by, these delays implicitly reflect tacit
consent by the parties to delay.91 Parties may also request the Secretariat to
suspend the panelist selection process, 92 and may provide in a settlement that
if implementation fails the selection process will resume.93 As of July 30,
2003, in eight of eighteen cases listed by the WTO Secretariat as "active
panels" where panels had been established, the panel had not yet been
composed, after delays ranging from one month to four years. 94
Settlement also occasionally occurs during a panel proceeding but as a
result of party initiative, not as a result of conciliation or mediation by the
panel. As noted above, WTO mediation has only taken place instead of, not
during, dispute settlement proceedings. DSU Article 12.12 permits a panel to
suspend its work at the request of the complaining party (a signal that
settlement talks are ongoing). Of the twelve cases where such suspensions
89 The U.S. complaint against Pakistan's failure to provide a "mailbox" for patent
applications under Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement was settled after a panel request
and before panel establishment. WTO, Notification of a Mutually-Agreed Solution,
Pakistan-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS36/4 (Mar. 7, 1997). Immediately after panel establishment pursuant to WTO,
Panel Request by India, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Women's and
Girls' Wool Coats-Communication from India, WT/DS32/2 (Apr. 30, 1996), the United
States withdrew the textile restraint at issue. Update, supra note 2, at 159.
90 Update, supra note 2, at 169 (regarding WTO, European Communities-Duties
on Imports of Grains, WT/DS 13).
91 DSU Article 8.7 provides that if there is no agreement as to the panelists within
twenty days after the date the panel is established, any party can ask the WTO Director-
General to complete the panel within ten days.
92 See WTO, Chile-Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish,
WT/DS/193/3 (Apr. 6, 2001) (cited in Update, supra note 2, at 173).
93 See WTO, Argentina-Transitional Safeguard Measures on Certain Imports of
Woven Fabrics of Cotton and Cotton Mixtures Originating in Brazil, WT/DS 190/2 (June
30, 2000) (cited in Update, supra note 2, at 165).
94 Update, supra note 2, at 38-50.
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have been notified, five have ripened into settlements; 95 in three, the parties
have let the panel lapse after a year of suspension, 96 and in four, suspension
talks were unsuccessful. 97 In theory, WTO panels may actively encourage
settlement, but in practice none do. Article 11 of the DSU provides that
panels "should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, '98 and
some GATT panel reports in the 1972-1984 period recorded activity by the
panel encouraging settlement negotiations. 99 But there is no trace in any
95 WTO, Panel Report, EC-Trade Description of Scallops, WT/DS7/R,
WT/DS12/R, WT/DS14/R (Aug. 5, 1996) (settlement just after interim panel report);
WTO, Belgium-Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice,
WT/DS210/5 (Nov. 21, 2001); WTO, United States-Anti-dumping Duty on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of one Megabit or Above from
Korea, WT/DS99/11 (Sept. 25, 2000) (settlement during DSU Art. 21.5 panel); WTO,
Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids, WT/DS21/9 (May 16,
2000) (settlement by the United States after suspending a U.S. case until just after
outcome of Canada Art. 21.5 panel against Australia on same issue); WTO, Panel Report,
European Communities-Measures Affecting Butter Products, WT/DS72/R (Nov. 24,
1999) (settlement just after interim panel report).
96 See WTO, United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,
WT/DS/38/6 (Apr. 24, 1998). This dispute on the "Helms-Burton Act" was resolved by
bilateral agreement just before the deadline for panel submissions, and against the
background of statements by the United States that it would refuse to participate in WTO
panel proceedings; see also WTO, United States-Measure Affecting Government
Procurement, WT/DS88/6, WT/95/6 (Feb. 14, 2000); WTO, Argentina-Measures
Affecting Textiles and Clothing, WT/DS77/6 (May 24, 2002).
97 WTO, Panel Report, EC-Trade Description of Sardines,WTIDS231IR (June 10,
2002) (attempt to settle after interim panel report); WTO, EC-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/4 (Jan. 18, 2002)
(settlement talks well before interim panel report); WTO, EC-Customs Classification of
Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/7 (Nov. 28, 1997) (attempt to settle after
interim panel report); WTO, Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/8 (Mar. 27, 1998) (attempt to settle just before
issuance of interim panel report).
98 This provision was incorporated from the 1979 Framework Agreement on dispute
settlement, supra note 43, at para. 16.
99 See the Dollar Banana case, supra note 41, and other reports recording
unsuccessful attempts by the panel to urge settlement. Canada-Withdrawal of Tariff
Concessions, GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 42, para. 5 (May 17, 1978); Norway-
Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products, GATT B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) at 119,
para. 4 (Jun. 18, 1980); Panel on Quantitative Restrictions against Imports of Certain
Products from Hong Kong, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 129, para. 4 (Jul. 12, 1983);
Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 94, para. 5
(May 15-16, 1984). Three GAIT panel reports from 1978-81 record settlements reached
concerning Japanese import measures against a background of encouragement by the
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WTO panel report of any conciliation or mediation activity by a WTO panel
during a panel proceeding.
Few cases settle during the active phase of a panel proceeding, mainly
for political or bureaucratic reasons and sunk costs. By the time a panel has
started its work, a defending party will have committed itself to defend the
measure at issue, making a policy reversal before the panel's verdict costly or
impossible. At trial in U.S. courts, there may be a large flow back and forth
of information so that the litigators on each side can have an increasingly
accurate estimate of their likelihood of prevailing and of the downside risk of
loss. But WTO litigation is episodic, with comparatively little information
flow; little of nothing changes during litigation to induce settlement.
Settlement motivated one feature of GATT dispute settlement, which
was inherited by the WTO: the practice of issuing the panel's final report to
the parties in advance of the public, so that the parties might have one last
chance to settle. Although some settlements occurred at that point during the
GATT era,100 the DSU regime provides for earlier interim panel reports.
Since in practice the bottom-line findings in an interim report do not change,
a well-organized litigant will use the interim panel report to consult with
stakeholders, evaluate the chances of an appeal, and either start writing its
appellate arguments or initiate settlement talks. In four cases on EC
measures, the interim panel report triggered serious settlement talks with the
EC. In the two cases where a deal was reached, the exporter agreed to bury
the legal findings in the panel reports and got immediate market access in
exchange. 101
No WTO case has yet been settled after a panel report is circulated and
before the report is adopted by the DSB together with the Appellate Body
report (if any). A case may be effectively settled or abandoned by a failure to
appeal an unfavorable ruling, but in many cases, the larger impacts flowing
from a panel ruling will impel a government to appeal. Conciliation and
settlement has never occurred in the middle of an appeal conducted on the
WTO's compressed time frame.102 Failure to appeal a panel report may
panel. Japan Measures on Imports of Thrown Silk Yam, GATT" B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at
107, para. 5 (May 17, 1978); Japan's Measures on Imports of Leather, GATT" B.I.S.D.
(27th Supp.) at 118, para. 4 (Nov. 10, 1980); Japanese Restraints on Imports of
Manufactured Tobacco from the United States, GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 100, para.
10 (Jun. 11, 1981).
100 See, e.g., Japan cases on thrown silk yam and tobacco, supra note 99.
101 WTO, Panel Report, EC-Trade Description of Scallops, WT/DS7/R,
WT/DS12/R, WT/DS14/R (Aug. 5, 1996) (complaints of Canada, Peru, and Chile settled
in 1996); WTO, EC-Measures Affecting Butter Products, WT/DS72/1 (Apr. 3, 1997)
(complaint by New Zealand settled in 1999).
102 There is one recorded case of a true abandonment of an appeal, by India in the
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signify settlement, 10 3 or a loss on factual grounds, 104 or may simply signify a
tactical decision to use the panel report as the basis for negotiations on
implementation.10 5
After the DSB has adopted the reports of the panel and the Appellate
Body, the implementation process begins, starting with setting a deadline for
compliance-a process that involves discussion of both what is required to
comply, and how long it will take. When the disputing parties cannot agree
on a compliance deadline and must ask an arbitrator to set it for them, the
likely cause is disagreement regarding what the losing party must do to
comply.10 6 A persistent litigant may continue to pursue compliance through
negotiations throughout the period before the WTO compliance deadline, to
the extent that the complying party is willing to talk.
After the compliance deadline passes, a complaining party that wishes to
seek a further WTO determination regarding the legality of measures taken to
dispute on India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, but India's withdrawal of
its appeal does not appear to have been associated with concessions by either side. India
complied with the panel recommendations and rulings but not until four months later. See
WTO, India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/9, WTI/DS175/9
(Mar. 14, 2002) (notice issued by Appellate Body regarding India's withdrawal);
WT/DS146/14, WT/DS175/14 (Nov. 13, 2002) (notification by India regarding
compliance). The United States withdrew its appeal in the U.S.-FSC case and refiled it.
See WTO, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"--Withdrawal
of Appeal, WTDS108/6 (Nov. 3, 1999) (withdrawl of notice of appeal); WT/DS 108/7
(Nov. 26, 1999) (notice of appeal refiled). The withdrawal and refiling were done for
scheduling reasons and were agreed in advance with the EC.
103 See e.g., WTO, Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998) (decision by Indonesia not to appeal the
panel report on the Suharto-period National Car Program). Indonesia had agreed with the
IMF to comply with the panel report.
104 E.g., Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998).
105 See, e.g., WTO, Panel Report, Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS 1 32/R (Jan. 28, 2000);
WTO, Panel Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in
Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea, WT/DS 179/R (Dec. 22, 2000);
WTO, Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
106 See, e.g., WTO, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan-Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on
Rules Legislating the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS184/13 (Feb. 19, 2002). The
fundamental disagreement between Japan and the United States concerned the contents of
required implementing legislation, whether corrective administrative action could be
taken during the legislative amendment process or would have to be taken afterward, and
how long legislation would take.
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comply may request a review by the original panel, under DSU Article 21.5.
The complaining party may also request the DSB to authorize suspension of
concessions (permitting assessment of retaliatory duties or quotas) against
the trade of the Member that has allegedly failed to comply, in an amount
equivalent to the nullification or impairment (the damage caused to the
complaining party's trade by the other party's failure to comply with WTO
obligations). The complying Member can ask for the original panel to
arbitrate regarding the proposed level of suspension of concessions.
Settlement of cases can happen during this post-compliance litigation. 107
Even after the DSB formally authorizes suspension of concessions, the
complaining party need not actually impose trade retaliation; after the DSB
authorized Canada to suspend concessions against Brazil, in a dispute
regarding export financing for aircraft, Canada did not do so and instead
pursued compliance.
After the complaining party suspends concessions and implements the
authorized retaliatory measures, it is still possible to reach a settlement and
such a settlement would presumably involve revocation of the measures. A
group of WTO Members has backed a proposal for DSU reform, one of the
elements of which is an expedited procedure to review post-retaliation
compliance measures and mandate their reduction or removal. 10 8 However,
so far the only way that retaliatory measures have been revoked has been
through a settlement agreement.10 9
107 The dispute on United States-Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea was settled
during an Article 21.5 compliance proceeding. See WTO, United States-Anti-Dumping
Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One
Megabit or Above from Korea, WT/DS99/12 (Oct. 25, 2000) (joint notification of
settlement by Korea and the United States). Upon request by the parties, the compliance
panel suspended its work and the parties settled the case based on a revocation of the
antidumping order in question as a result of a five-year "sunset" review by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The notification of settlement was submitted after the
Commerce Department announced revocation. See Anti-Dumping Measures on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from
Korea, Final Results of Fall Sunset Review and Revocation of Order, 65 Fed. Reg.
59,391 (Oct. 5, 2000).
108 WTO, Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Clarifications and
Improvements of the Dispute Settlement Understanding-Proposal by Japan,
TN/DS/W/22 (Oct. 28, 2002) (resubmitting group proposal, WT/MIN(01/W/6)).
109 After many attempts, the Bananas dispute was finally settled through
negotiations in April 2001. See WTO, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution,
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/58 (July, 2, 2001). The GATr waiver required in order to implement the
settlement consistent with the WTO Agreement was eventually approved at the Doha
Ministerial Meeting. WTO, Ministerial Conference, European Communities-
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V. LITIGATION AND NEGOTIATION MODELS AND WTO DIsPuTE
SETTLEMENT
With this discussion as background, we turn to economic models of
dispute settlement. Civil litigation models fall into two basic types: those
based on optimism (the parties' subjective opinions about the likely
outcome) and those based on asymmetry of information. The decision
whether to settle a claim is modeled as a strategic bargaining game affected
by the expected outcome at trial, and the expected value of settlement or trial
in turn determines whether a harmed party brings a claim. The analysis
works backwards from the expected outcome, assuming strategic behavior by
the players. Litigation bargaining is modeled as a cooperative game whose
cooperative solution is settlement and whose noncooperative solution is
trial. 110 The players are assumed to be rational, unitary decisionmakers who
make their decisions on the basis of expected costs and benefits from the
possible outcome and the expected costs of the litigation necessary to get
there.
In an optimism model, the sum of the plaintiff's threat value (expected
gain from going to trial minus trial costs), and the defendant's threat value
(expected loss from trial plus trial costs) equals the noncooperative value of
the game, or the plaintiff's expected gain less the defendant's net loss minus
the trial costs of both parties. The surplus generated from cooperation
(settlement) equals the difference between the costs of trial and the costs of
settlement, plus the difference in subjective expectations about damages to be
awarded at trial. If this surplus is positive there is scope for settlement. There
is more scope for settlement when trial costs are higher, when transaction
costs of settlement are lower, when the plaintiff believes it will win less than
the defendant believes it will lose (the parties are pessimistic), or when the
parties are risk-averse. When the plaintiffs minimum expected win, less
costs, exceeds the defendant's maximum expected loss, the settlement range
disappears. Assuming strategic behavior, an increase in the damages that can
be awarded will increase the payoff to the plaintiff from trial, increasing the
parties' optimism and making trial more likely. On the other hand, an
increase in damages will also tend to increase the amount parties will spend
on trying to win at trial, increasing the surplus from cooperation, making trial
less attractive to risk-averse defendants, and making settlement more
likely. 111
Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas, WT/MIN(01)/16 (Nov.
14, 2001).
110 Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 6, at 1069.
111 Id. at 1075-77.
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Models that focus on asymmetries of information assume that if both
parties know whether the plaintiff will win, they will reach a settlement
dividing the surplus generated by not going to trial. Failure to settle occurs
because one side has less knowledge than the other about the facts and law
determining liability and damages, and therefore is unable to make an offer
that the other side should accept. If the defendant has better knowledge of the
factual issues or legal analysis that determine whether the plaintiff will win at
trial, and the plaintiff only knows what the average success rate of lawsuits
is, then the defendant will be equipped to accept settlement offers when it
knows it will lose, and reject them if it expects to win. Since the cases where
the defendant would lose at trial are all settled, defendants then win in most
trials. Corresponding results apply if the plaintiff has better information, as at
trial mainly the better-informed side wins. 112
Andrew Guzman has pointed out the apparent contradiction between the
results predicted by the asymmetric information model and the rulings
observed in the GATT and at the WTO. In the overwhelming majority of
GATT cases, the panel ruled for the complaining party on some or all claims.
The same is true to a slightly lesser extent in the WTO; Guzman still
calculates a 90% win rate for complaining parties, based on panel and
Appellate Body rulings.11 3 Guzman argues that complaining parties could not
possibly be better-informed than defending parties and rejects the
asymmetric information model as an explanation for the complainant win
rate.114 The batting average of complaining parties in the WTO does raise the
question: if a defending party has superior information on whether it will
lose, or is even aware of the average success rate of defending parties in the
WTO, why does it continue to pursue a losing case instead of doing the
rational thing by negotiating a settlement, and why does this happen in case,
after case, after case? Is this seemingly irrational behavior fully explained by
the lack of retroactive damages in GATT/WTO litigation and consequent
lack of any penalty for delay, or is there something more going on? 115
112 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information,
15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); ANDREw T. GUZMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO 4 (UC Berkeley Public Law & Legal Theory,
Res. Paper No. 98, 2002), at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=335924.
113 Guzman, supra note 107, at 4. "Win" is defined in the paper as a finding of
violation of at least one WTO obligation.
114 For instance, most complainant cases are brought by a few countries, and the
same litigants (and their lawyers) are alternately complainants and defending parties. Id.
at 5-6.
115 See generally Steven Shavell, Suit Versus Settlement When Parties Seek
Nonmonetary Judgments, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1993) (modeling breakdown in
negotiations when bargaining involves an indivisible item and nonmonetary relief;
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In Guzman's model, these lopsided statistics are a function of
asymmetric political payoffs, assuming that a panel win means the defending
party eliminates the measure. 116 Assuming that information on probability of
success is common knowledge, the settlement amount must be at least as
much as the complainant's expected net return from winning, and not more
than the defending party's expected cost if the case goes to the panel. An
increase in the probability of a complainant victory at panel will shrink the
settlement range if and only if the cost to a defending party of losing at the
panel stage, plus the impact of delay, are larger than the complaining party's
payoff from panel victory minus the impact of delay. In this model, cases
settle because the defendant's incentive to pay to make them go away, even
though the defendant benefits from delay, is stronger than the complaining
party's incentive to win before the panel (net of delay costs). The fact that the
complainant mainly wins means that for most WTO complaints, the
defending party's cost of going through the panel process is smaller than the
benefits of a win to the complaining party. 117
Cases also fail to settle, according to Guzman, because the benefits of
delay to the defending party and the ability to claim that its hands are tied,
exceed the defendant's perceived cost from a negative panel ruling
(including the expected cost of compliance, the expected cost of sanctions in
the event of noncompliance, and the expected cost of future claims that might
be based on the ruling as a precedent). 118
If a defending party cannot agree to a result that will satisfy the
complaining party unless it has already lost a panel proceeding, the ability for
the government to claim its hands are tied by the WTO becomes a benefit
only obtainable through a panel ruling, to be netted out against the costs to it
of a panel proceeding: settlement is only possible after a panel ruling. As
Guzman notes, a complaining party also might be pressured by a stakeholder
and unable to give up on a low-probability WTO claim unless officially
rejected by a panel. 119
application of models of such situations to bargaining situations typical in the WTO
could prove fruitful).
116 This is a strong assumption in view of observed non-compliance rates. In the
GATT, only 40% of complaining party wins were followed by full concessions. Marc
Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of
GATTWTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLMCAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
EsSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT HUDEc 471 (Daniel M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick
eds., 2002).
117 Guzman, supra note 112, at 11-12.
118 Id. at 14.
119 Id. at 15.
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Alternative explanations exist for the high complainant win rate.
Specifically, complaining parties almost always settle or abandon cases that
are not going to win, or they do not bring them to begin with. But this in turn
is more easily explained by abandoning the assumption that both parties have
common knowledge of the probability of success, and observing that the
extent of information asymmetry may change over time. Until the panel
rules, the complaining party may be better informed than the defending party
about the ultimate strength of its complaint and its ability to assemble the
factual and legal arguments necessary to meet its burden of proof. Common
sense tells us that no matter what the litigation forum, a party who sues and
fails to win is always substantially worse off than if it had never sued at all.
Before losing in court, even a nuisance plaintiff has some possibility of
obtaining a settlement if a risk-averse defendant does not know how good the
case really is, and would rather not go to court to find out. 120 After losing in
court or in the WTO, the complaining government or its stakeholder has
removed any mystery about the value of its legal claims, and in the process
has confirmed that the defending party only did what it had every right to
do. 121
We then have three types of explanations for why WTO Members,
particularly defending parties, appear not to be settling cases in a rational
manner: because both sides are too optimistic; because asymmetries of
information are most possible at the time of settlement; and because the
defending party has insufficient incentives to pay to make the case go away.
V1. PROMOTING SETTLEMENT?
Early settlement of WTO disputes by negotiation and agreement has real
social and economic benefits. If the parties cannot reach a settlement without
going through panel and Appellate Body proceedings, or even further steps
up through retaliation, the costs of their inability to settle include not just the
parties' legal costs and the political costs of moving a case forward, but also
the wear and tear on the WTO and bystander governments and private parties
from retaliation, distraction from other initiatives, and loss of potential gains
from cooperation. Even settlement during the later phases of a dispute may
be Pareto-superior to a litigated outcome with perfect compliance, since
typically there are a range of outcomes possible under compliance, and some
120 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437, 440 (1988).
121 For instance, the outcome for the Canadian asbestos industry after the WTO




will not help the stakeholder. From a defending government's viewpoint,
settlement may let the government address a stakeholder's market access
problem while avoiding findings that would call for costly legislative
changes.
Settlement is particularly important for the mainstream cases, with stakes
that range from purely symbolic to commercially moderate ($150 million).
How can the WTO facilitate bargaining that will address the concerns of both
sides in these disputes?
The optimism model suggests that the settlement ranges of parties will be
increased if the marginal cost of panel proceedings is higher, if the
transaction costs of negotiation and settlement are lowered, and if disputants
become more pessimistic about going through with panel proceedings or
more risk-averse. Conversely, settlement would become less likely where the
marginal cost of panel proceedings is low, negotiating a deal is difficult, or
disputants are more optimistic. Thus, relevant factors include the marginal
cost of panel proceedings, the transaction costs of negotiation and settlement,
and party optimism.
WTO panel proceedings are more technical than panel proceedings under
the GATT, include more issues and include an appeal: they obviously cost
more. Some parties outsource litigation functions by the hour; others rely on
salaried staff. Almost all require business stakeholders seeking governmental
espousal of a complaint to provide (or pay for) legal assistance. The same
governments may rely on salaried government counsel to defend government
policies and actions-lowering their perceived marginal costs of litigation
and consequently these defendants' propensity to settle. Costs of litigation
also include the political cost (and corresponding political benefit) of
pursuing a WTO case, which may exceed the importance of the dollar
amount at stake.
The transaction costs of settlement in a WTO proceeding start with the
obstacles to communication and establishment of the trust necessary to reach
agreement. Transaction costs could be expected to be lower for negotiating
dyads who work together and against each other on many issues:
unsurprisingly, Busch and Reinhardt find that the EC and United States tend
to settle cases before panel proceedings, with the defending party offering
concessions in advance of a panel ruling 58% of the time in the 1960-2001
period, and in 66% of all bilateral WTO disputes. 122 Frequent interaction
between litigants' representatives promotes trust and reputation, fostering
more efficient settlement. 123 Transaction costs impeding settlement also
122 Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 25, at 7.
123 See Joel Waldfogel & Jason Scott Johnston, Does Repeat Play Elicit
Cooperation?: Evidence from Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40-41 (2002)
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include uncertainty about the stability of any deal. At present, the parties to a
settlement agreement cannot use the WTO Agreement to enforce the terms of
the deal as such, 124 and must trust each other or rely on the leverage of re-
starting dispute settlement if the deal falls through. If the terms of the deal
commit the defending party to take one of multiple compliance paths and the
wrong compliance path is taken, the complaining party has no remedy.
Transaction costs may also relate to the nature of the matter in dispute.
Securing a statutory change is more costly for a defending party than revising
a regulation; a domestic regulatory statute may be structured so as to make it
difficult or impossible for an administering agency to change the outcome for
reasons (such as WTO obligations) that are extraneous to the statute itself.
The subject of the dispute may also be inherently "lumpy," making it
difficult to find a compromise. 125
What measures would reduce the transaction costs of settlement? Privacy
for the negotiating process can be essential for developing trust; this was the
underlying rationale for traditional GATT document restrictions and for
similar rules in WTO dispute settlement. 126 The rule excluding use of
(examining a database of 2000 federal civil cases filed in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in 1994 and finding that cases involving attorney pairs who interact
repeatedly are resolved more quickly and are more likely to settle).
124 Under DSU Article 1.1, DSU rules and procedures apply only to disputes
brought under the agreements listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU; these agreements include
only treaty texts in the WTO package, not bilateral settlement agreements.
125 Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel?: An Empirical
Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205, 222-23 (2002) (finding that transaction costs are very likely to explain
escalation of disputes to the panel stage, and that "lumpy" issues-standards, tariff
classification, product bans, absence of required laws-are more likely to escalate than
"continuous" issues-tariffs, quotas, subsidies-for democratic countries). But
experience provides examples of such "lumpy" issues that were not inherently
indivisible, but susceptible to compromise. Compromises expressed in federal regulations
appear every day of the week in the Federal Register. The first WTO dispute to go to a
panel, on United States-Conventional and Reformulated Gasoline (WT/DS2), was
almost settled through a compromise reflected in a proposed rule issued by EPA on April
21, 1994, altering only the rule's provisions on reformulated gasoline. See Regulation of
Fuels and Fuel Additives: Individual Foreign Refinery Baseline Requirements for
Reformulated Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,800 (May 3, 1994). Implementation of this
compromise was only blocked by a targeted provision in Senate appropriations
legislation. See Venezuela Vows GATT Challenge Following House Vote On Gas Rules,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 16, 1994. The disputes on Scallops, supra note 90 and Butter,
supra note 90 were both settled.
126The information restrictions in question are better described as protecting
process values and privacy, since in almost all cases the documents contained no secrets.
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settlement offers in litigation 127 fits under this category as well. Enhancing
communication and trust argues for a policy decision by individual litigant
governments to involve negotiators on the dispute settlement team
throughout a case, to avoid losing focus on settlement. The Advisory Centre
for WTO Law, founded in 1999 as an intergovernmental organization,
provides low-cost legal assistance on WTO law (including dispute
settlement) to developing countries. If settlement is perceived as valuable,
then legal aid to developing countries might be expanded to include expert
assistance from trade negotiation professionals. Settlement agreements could
also be made clearly enforceable, as Andrew Shoyer and Joost Pauwelyn
have suggested. 128 Where "lumpiness" exists, it could be overcome by
facilitating cash settlements, including side-payments to injured stakeholders.
It might be argued that the WTO could itself actively encourage
settlement, by mandating more (or more genuine) conciliation effort by
litigants, or perhaps by encouraging panel chairmen to lean on the parties,
like a judge in a settlement conference for a tort case. But there may be little
appetite for this among the litigant governments, who as DSB members have
the last word on whether to accept any proposed change to the DSU.
Mediation, conciliation, and the ability to call on the good offices of the
Director-General on a voluntary basis during a dispute already exist under
the present DSU rules, and Members are not using them. To argue that it is
good to settle disputes is not to argue that it is bad to bring disputes or assert
claims, but no litigant would publicly prefer a return to the GATT of the
1970s, when rule violation by the strong was widespread, and smaller players
were expected to hold back tastefully on asserting their GATT rights. 129
Proposals in the DSU negotiations and discussions in academic literature
have argued for increasing the payoff to the complaining party through a
change in the remedy provided by WTO panels. Provision of retroactive
damages is widely supported in the academic literature as a means of
discouraging hit-and-run behavior (like a three-month import ban during the
peak market for a seasonal product), encouraging early compliance, and
deterring governments from malicious delay. But aside from the other policy
arguments for retroactive damages, it is not clear whether they would
necessarily increase settlement. The availability of retroactive damages
would make escalating to the panel process more costly, increasing the
benefits of earlier settlement, particularly for a party that is risk-averse.
127 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
128 Andrew W. Shoyer, The First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement:
Observations and Suggestions, 1 J. INT'L ECON. LAw 277, 287 (1998); Joost Pauwelyn,
The Americanization of Dispute Settlement, 19 OtUo ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 121 (2003).
129 See supra text accompanying note 99.
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However, because a damage award would only be available if there were no
settlement before a panel ruling, the possibility of damages would also
increase the complaining party's expected gain from the panel process,
decrease the complaining party's willingness to settle before a panel ruling,
and decrease pre-panel settlement. 130
A change in the DSU rules to provide for damages would also have
distributional implications for the terms of settlement. If damages can only
be awarded to the complaining party, the complaining party will raise its
price for forgoing a panel ruling, and on average, settlement terms will tip
toward complainants. This distributional effect may be what developing
country negotiators had in mind in proposing damage awards in the GATT
and WTO. 131 However, any government that views itself as a net payer is
likely to be reluctant to accept a damages scheme, particularly if the scheme
is seen as altering the terms of pre-panel settlement and thereby encouraging
claims.
Another possibility is to authorize the panel to give a cash award to
either side on an equitable basis for its legal costs for the panel proceeding,
and the Appellate Body to similarly award costs of the appeal to either side.
ICSID tribunals arbitrating investment disputes are empowered to determine
who bears the expenses incurred by the parties, the fees and expenses of the
tribunal members, and ICSID's charges for the use of the dispute settlement
facilities it provides. 132 The complaining party could be awarded its expenses
if it completely or overwhelmingly prevails on the merits; similarly, the
defending party could be awarded its expenses in the case of a meritless
nuisance suit. 133 By raising the amount at stake in a panel ruling, this change
130 See Bebchuk, supra note 107, at 413 (making the same prediction based on a
model focused on informational asymmetries). In his model, the greater the amount that
depends on a trial's outcome, the greater the likelihood of litigation.
131 The first proposals for award of damages in the GATT were made by Brazil and
Uruguay in the mid-1960s. See Committee on Trade and Development, GATT B.I.S.D.
(14th Supp.) at 129, 139-40, paras. 41-47 (Apr. 5, 1996). In the ongoing DSU review,
the LDC Group and the African Group have proposed awards of monetary compensation
to complainants. See WTO, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding-
Proposal by the African Group, TN/DS/W/15, at 2-3 (Sept. 25, 2002); WTO, Text for
LDC Proposal on DSU Negotiations-Communication from Haiti, TN/DS/W/37, at 3
(Jan. 22, 2003).
132 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, art. 61(2), 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
133 See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001).
This leading treatise on ICSID arbitration states that ICSID practice on apportioning costs
is "neither clear nor uniform." Id. at 1225. Rather, Schreuer suggests the following
principles: Generally, the parties should split the costs of the arbitration and pay for their
own expenses; if a party has completely or overwhelmingly prevailed on the merits, the
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would also decrease the probability of settlement before a ruling, but its
distributional effects would be more ambiguous, and more salable.
However, for cash awards of any type to be credible enough to alter
parties' behavior in bargaining and settlement, they would also need to be
guaranteed against blockage. In the United States, for instance, cash
payments from the U.S. government to settle claims against it must go
through the normal congressional budget and appropriations process,
affording many opportunities for blockage. In 2001, the United States and
EC reached a creative settlement of the Section 110 dispute: 134 the EC agreed
to accept a cash payment in lieu of compliance for the three years starting
December 21, 2001, and the United States agreed to pay $3.3 million to a
fund established by EC performing rights societies to assist their members
and promote authors' rights.' 35 After finally agreeing to appropriate the
money in 2003, the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of
Representatives put on the record its hostility toward such cash payments to
settle trade disputes, and its unwillingness to appropriate any further funds
for this purpose. 136 This pre-emptive move may have been primarily targeted
losing party may have to bear a majority of the arbitration costs and part or all of the
winner's expenses; misconduct by a party during the proceedings should be reflected in
the award of costs; a party that is responsible for a particular part of the proceeding (e.g.,
a visit by the arbitrators to the site of an investment) should bear the resulting costs. Id. at
1231-32. Rule 28(2) of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings
requires each party to an ICSID arbitration, and the ICSID Secretariat, to submit a
statement of costs reasonably borne by it to the tribunal promptly after closure of the
proceeding.
134 WTO, Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS 160/R (June 15, 2000) (adopted July 27, 2000).
135 WTO, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act-Notification of a
Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement, WTIDS160/23 (June 26, 2003).
136 See House Appropriators Reject Cash Settlements for Trade Disputes, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Aug. 8, 2003 (citing text from H.R. REP. No. 108-221, Committee Report
on H.R. 2799, the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004).
WTO Fund. The Trade Act of 2002 established a fund for the payment of total
or partial settlement of any dispute before the World Trade Organization. No funds
have been provided in this or any other Act to capitalize the fund. Public Law 108-
11 included a lump-sum payment to the European Communities to cover a three-
year period in a music-licensing dispute. However, this was intended as a one-time
only appropriation. There is a long-established practice of using suspension of tariff
concessions to resolve trade disputes and the Committee does not intend to
appropriate funds to settle these matters. The Committee cautions U.S. negotiators
that there should be no commitments made within trade agreements to use funds
from the U.S. Treasury that have neither been requested nor appropriated to resolve
trade disputes.
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at the Administration, but it points to a generic problem: if the government in
question moves pre-emptively to refuse payment, it will impair the credibility
of any cash award against it, with effects back along the decision chain of the
parties to a dispute.
The DSU rules could make WTO damage awards of any type credible,
by requiring each Member to recognize such awards as binding, and
requiring each Member to enforce the pecuniary obligations of such awards
as if the award were a final judgment in its domestic courts, including access
to the laws regarding execution of judgments. This is the method by which
the ICSID Convention guarantees that cash awards made by ICSID tribunals
will be paid.137 The certainty of payment this conveys promotes the
substantial settlement rate in ICSID cases. If the WTO adopted this rule, a
winning WTO government faced with a defendant who refused to pay could
simply levy on the defendant's assets anywhere in the territory of WTO
Members. Such a change seems no more likely to please House
appropriators, but would make cash awards credible.
Information models of settlement point to asymmetries of information as
the cause of failure to settle: one side has less knowledge than the other about
the facts and law determining liability and damages and therefore is unable to
make an offer that the other side should accept. We have discussed above the
practical problems of building a WTO case, and the lack of any organized
discovery process during the consultation period before the parties commit
themselves to going through panel proceedings. The WTO could reduce
asymmetry of information, and promote early settlement, by providing such a
discovery process. An example of an information-gathering process already
exists, in the procedures for developing information concerning "serious
prejudice" in Annex V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. 138 Some sort of supervision would have to be provided for this
discovery process, to avoid the "discovery wars" of big-stakes U.S.
commercial litigation. 139
William Davey, former director of the WTO Legal Division, argues that
"[t]urning the consultation process into a pre-trial discovery mechanism
Id.
137 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, supra note 126, at art. 54.
138 WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex V,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/24-scm 01_e.htm (discussing
procedures utilized in WTO, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998)).
139 See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & ROBERT WILSON, A THEORY OF EFFICIENT
DISCOVERY (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School,
Working Paper No. 136, 1996).
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would likely undermine chances of settlement, as the process in practice
would likely be directed exclusively at preparing for the panel stage of the
process, which would promote an adversarial approach."' 140 Yet unless a
complaining party's objective can only be delivered by panel litigation-as is
the case if the objective is the panel or Appellate Body report itself-the
parties should be more willing to settle if they have more equal knowledge of
how the case will come out.
VII. U.S. SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS
The Trade Act of 2002, which authorized U.S. participation in the Doha
Development Agenda negotiations, required the U.S. Department of
Commerce, in consultation with other executive branch agencies, to submit a
report by the end of 2002 addressing congressional concerns that decisions of
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have added to U.S. obligations and
diminished U.S. rights in respect of antidumping, countervailing duty and
safeguard measures. 141 The concerns expressed relate to the recent string of
U.S. losses in dispute settlement regarding U.S. trade remedy measures. The
report that Commerce submitted 142 provides a snapshot of U.S. experience
with WTO dispute settlement, expresses concern about cases involving U.S.
trade remedies, and proposes an executive branch strategy in two parts, led
by negotiation in the Doha Round talks. An appendix to the report attaches a
U.S.-Chile proposal tabled in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations on
dispute settlement, suggesting changes to the DSU with the stated objectives
of providing greater Member control over the dispute settlement process and
greater flexibility to settle disputes. 143 The proposals, as later elaborated by
the United States and Chile, 144 include:
1 4 0 WILLIAM DAVEY, THE WTO DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 11 (Illinois
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. 03-08, 2003),
at http://ssm.com/abstract=419943.
141 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2105(b)(3), 116 Stat. 1016 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 3805) (timely submission of this report was a condition precedent for the
provision of expedited Congressional treatment ("fast track" or "trade promotion
authority") for implementing legislation for any agreements reached in the Doha
Development Agenda negotiations).
142 Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Panels and the Appellate Body,
Report to the Congress Transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce, Dec. 30, 2003, at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/FinalDec31ReportCorrected.pdf.
143 Id. (attachment at http://www.ita.doc.gov/ReporttoCongressAppendix.pdf).
144 WTO, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute
Settlement-Textual Contribution by Chile and the United States, TN/DS/W/52 (Mar. 14,
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
* a right for parties to an appeal to see and comment on a draft of the
Appellate Body's report before the Appellate Body finalizes the report;
e a right for the parties to a dispute, if they agree, to delete findings in a
panel or Appellate Body report that they believe are not necessary or helpful
to resolving a dispute;
* a right for panel or Appellate Body proceedings to be suspended if the
parties so agree;
e a right for the DSB to decide by consensus not to adopt a particular
finding in a panel or Appellate Body report;
* a requirement that panelists have expertise to examine the matter at
issue in the dispute; and
* additional guidance to the Appellate Body and panels on their work.
The United States also continues to advocate that all panel, Appellate
Body and arbitration meetings be open for public observation except for
portions dealing with confidential information; that all written submissions
should be public when submitted and maintained in a central registry; that
final reports of panels be immediately available to the public when issued to
the parties; and that there be procedures for handling amicus curiae
submissions to panels and the Appellate Body.145
The U.S.-Chile proposal could make settlements more likely, although
not settlements before the parties have invested time and resources in a panel
proceeding. At present, settlement during Appellate Body proceedings is
unheard of. The sunk costs of the parties are high, and the marginal cost of
proceeding low; the compressed timeframe of the process raises the
transaction cost of settlement by making it costly to divert resources into
settlement talks. The addition of an opportunity for comments would
lengthen the proceedings and increase marginal litigation costs, creating
some remaining surplus to divide under cooperation. Theory predicts that
giving the parties to the case a license to delete particular legal findings-a
concept difficult for smaller WTO Members to accept-will reduce
lumpiness and therefore the transaction costs of settlement.
Information-based theory tells us that the proposal would create an
opportunity for the litigants to talk with maximum knowledge of what the
legal outputs of the dispute will be. Bargaining where the shadow of the law
is strongest gives each party the best position to make the other side offers
that should be in that side's interest to accept. The parties will also be in the
best position to sell a compromise solution to those excessively optimistic
2003).
145 WTO, Further Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the




domestic stakeholders who will not accept loss until it stares them in the
face. Indeed, the U.S.-Chile proposal, by pointing to the Appellate Body
process, implies that the frequency with which the Appellate Body reverses
panel reports has created expectations that make it difficult to settle a case
before an appeal. 146
There are two caveats. First, we assume the objective of the proposal is
to facilitate settlement in WTO cases involving challenges to trade remedies.
Is the objective to allow a country whose trade remedy measure is challenged
in the WTO to avoid a panel ruling that would set a precedent generally
limiting trade remedy use by reaching a practical settlement with the
complaining country? If so, getting to agreement may require the importing
country (and the domestic petitioner in the underlying trade remedy action)
to be in a position to make a deal, either by adjusting or dropping the trade
remedy measure or by providing some other form of compensation that will
interest the complaining country and its private stakeholders. If domestic
trade remedy laws tie the hands of the importing government and prevent it
from making offers that will interest the complaining party, there will be no
deal. Second, transparency in dispute settlement may have supervening
importance for civil society and for the legitimacy of the WTO, but it also
means tradeoffs for settlement of disputes by agreement. The U.S.-Chile
proposal would reduce transaction costs for settlement, but increased
transparency would increase transaction costs. It is not possible to have it
both ways.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
This long discussion should conclude simply, with a list of the practical
suggestions above and some notes on a further research agenda on settlement
in the WTO. As for the suggestions:
* Provide a supervised discovery process to parties before they commit
to the panel process;
* Maintain privacy in the negotiating process, including the rule
excluding use of settlement offers in litigation;
* Involve negotiators on the dispute settlement team throughout a case,
to avoid losing focus on settlement;
* Expand existing WTO-related legal aid to developing countries to
include expert assistance from trade negotiation professionals;
146 The proposal is clearly perceived, at least by some, as an attack on the Appellate
Body. See, e.g., the comments of former Appellate Body Member Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann on this Proposal, in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on the Appellate
Body of the WTO, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 695, 707 (2003).
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* Make settlement agreements enforceable, thus making it possible for
litigants to make (and be paid for) binding commitments regarding which of
multiple compliance paths they will choose;
* Consider cash settlements on an ad-hoc basis to address problems.
A research agenda for dispute settlement begins with better empirical
data on outcomes in cases. There are many questions of both theoretical and
practical interest that could be asked and answered if the data permitted. If
cases are characterized as either policy cases or cases brought for
stakeholders, what measurable differences exist between them, and how can
these differences be rationally explained? How can we distinguish between
cases that have been settled and cases that have been abandoned by the
complaining party? How does settlement behavior in the WTO compare to
other fora such as ICSID or other investor-state disputes under bilateral
investment treaties or disputes under regional trade agreements? And as the
brief discussion above shows, further work in modeling WTO disputes, or
testing models against the features of WTO dispute settlement, can produce
insights that are both interesting and practically useful.
